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Abstract
The legal obligation on employers to provide information to employees has grown since the
early 1970s.  At that time, the emphasis was on disclosure for collective bargaining.  In the
1980s and 1990s, the emphasis shifted more to disclosure for joint consultation.  In the context
of new legislation, the possibility of further interventions from Europe, and a greater
commitment to openness in other areas of company and public life, disclosure of information
for collective bargaining and joint consultation at work is again on the agenda.  This article
focuses on disclosure for both of these processes.  Disclosure for collective bargaining is the
most developed and potentially significant area of the law from an industrial relations
perspective.  Disclosure for joint consultation, however, has been the most dynamic area in
recent years.  Voluntary information provision by firms has also been a significant part of
developing human resource management practice.  The paper therefore provides a broad
examination of the law on disclosure.  The UK provisions are conceptualised as constituting an
agenda-driven disclosure model; i.e. the trigger for their use lies within the bargaining agenda.
By contrast, the provisions stemming from European initiatives are event-driven; i.e. they are
triggered by specific employer initiated events that affect employment contracts in other ways
irrespective of the representative context.  In the final sections, we attempt a broader evaluation
of the intent and impact of the legislation and assess the pros and cons of the different
approaches.
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Introduction
In the UK, the legal obligation on employers to provide information to employees has grown
since the early 1970s.  At that time, the emphasis was on disclosure for collective bargaining.
In the 1980s and 1990s, there was a new emphasis on disclosure as part of joint consultation
at work.  This reflected a number of factors – the predisposition of the then Conservative
government, growing European influence, and the preference of many employers for
information provision as part of new human resource management strategies.  Despite
considerable changes in collective labour legislation over two decades, the law on disclosure
of information for collective bargaining remained unamended and has been slowly developed
by the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC).  In the context of new legislation from a
Labour government and the possibility of further interventions from Europe, disclosure of
information for collective bargaining and joint consultation should again be on the agenda.1
In opposition, Labour acknowledged the need for a new approach to industrial relations
in general and to disclosure in particular, stating prior to the 1997 general election that a
proper flow of information is ‘fundamental to good relations and a positive partnership
between employer and employee.’2  In the white paper, Fairness at Work, the Labour
government stated that ‘employers will in the future have clearer obligations to inform and
consult recognised trade unions or, in their absence, other independent employee
representatives.’3  However, the precise implications of this were not further elaborated.  To
date, the government has accepted various aspects of European social policy and has
introduced certain new rights for unions and employees.   It is also reviewing the existing
legislation on collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings, both of which contain
disclosure provisions.  Yet, in the Employment Relations Act, there is only one provision
which extends information disclosure, namely in the area of training.4
Outside the employment law area, there are new proposals for more disclosure in
company law and for greater freedom of information in public life.5  In the corporate
governance area, there are also new proposals for greater voluntary disclosure to
shareholders, though not to other stakeholders in the enterprise.6  Also, within management,
over the last two decades, there has been a renewed interest in information sharing, in the
context of management-sponsored or -controlled consultative committees, briefing groups,
and other communications initiatives.7
In the light of this activity and the promise of a new openness, it would be a pity if the
present legislative situation with regard to disclosure at work were to remain unreformed.
Where trade unions are recognised for collective bargaining, there needs to be a flow of
information to make negotiations meaningful.  Moreover, if employees and their
representatives are to be in a position to negotiate effectively on employment matters, a
timely and adequate flow of information is also essential.  If social partnership is to deserve
its name, then one prerequisite is more equal access to useful information.
2This article focuses on disclosure for both collective bargaining and joint consultation
purposes. Disclosure for collective bargaining is the most developed and potentially
significant area of the law from an industrial relations perspective.  Disclosure for joint
consultation, however, has been the most dynamic area in recent years.  Voluntary
information provision by firms has also been a significant part of developing human resource
management practice.  The article therefore surveys earlier research on the law on disclosure
of information for collective bargaining.8  It also provides a broader examination of the law
on disclosure for joint consultation.  In the final sections, we attempt a broader evaluation of
the intent and impact of the legislation.
2. The Legal Context
Provision for legally-based disclosure of information for collective bargaining was first
outlined in the Labour white paper, In Place of Strife, and was contained in its 1970 Industrial
Relations Bill.  Similar clauses re-appeared in the Conservatives’ Industrial Relations Act
1971, supplemented by a Code of Practice and a report from the Commission on Industrial
Relations.9  These sections, only marginally amended, were then re-enacted in the
Employment Protection Act (EPA) 1975 and were backed up by a new Code of Practice from
the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS).  Despite a proposal from the
Conservatives to repeal the legislation in 1996,10 the law remains unamended and is now
contained in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act (TULRCA) 1992.
Under section 181 (2), an employer is obliged to disclose information:  (a) without
which a union would be materially impeded in collective bargaining and (b) which it would
be in accordance with good industrial relations practice to disclose.11  However, a
precondition has to be satisfied.  Section 181 (1) provides that the bargaining must be about
matters and in relation to workers in respect of which the union is recognised by the
employer.12  Employers are then specifically exempted under section 182 (1) from supplying
certain types of information:  (a) which would be against the interests of national security; (b)
which it would be illegal to disclose; (c) which had been communicated in confidence; (d)
which relates specifically to an individual; (e) which would cause substantial injury to an
employer’s undertaking for reasons other than its effect on collective bargaining; or (f) which
relates to legal proceedings.  There are two further restrictions on union rights under sections
182 (2) (a) and (b):  first, the employer does not have to disclose information, the compilation
of which would involve a disproportionate amount of work; second, the employer does not
have to provide documents other than ones specifically prepared for the purpose of providing
the information.
The Act is supplemented by an ACAS Code of Practice.  This lists items which might
be relevant to collective bargaining, under the headings of pay and benefits, conditions of
service, manpower, and performance and financial matters.  A second list contains items
which might cause substantial injury to the employer.  The latter list includes:  cost
information on individual products; detailed analyses of proposed investment, sales, or
prices; and quotes on the make-up of tender prices.  The Code states that substantial injury
may occur, if customers or suppliers would be lost.13
A complaints procedure is outlined under section 183.  If a union considers that an
employer has failed to meet the statutory requirement, it may complain to the CAC.  If the
latter feels the complaint may be settled by conciliation, it must refer the matter to ACAS.  If
a settlement is not forthcoming, the Committee then hears the complaint and issues a
declaration, stating whether it finds all or part of the claim well-founded.  Where the
complaint is upheld, the Committee is required to specify the information that should be
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may bring a further complaint before the Committee, which again may issue a declaration.14
If the employer still refuses to disclose, the union may again complain to the CAC and
request that certain improvements in terms and conditions be incorporated into the contracts
of relevant employees.15  If the CAC upholds the complaint, it may make an award either for
the improvements desired by the union or other terms and conditions as it considers
appropriate.16  This then becomes an implied term of the individual employee’s contract of
employment.17
Other legislation on information disclosure, enacted in recent years relates either to
both collective bargaining and joint consultation or to joint consultation alone.  In response to
European Directives, employers have been obliged to disclose information to recognised
unions and to employee representatives in the event of redundancies and business transfers.
These obligations were the result of the Collective Redundancies Directive (75/129) and the
Acquired Rights Directive (77/187).  The former was originally enacted into UK law by the
Employment Protection Act 1975 and the latter by the Transfer of Undertaking (Protection of
Employment) Regulations 1981.  The original provisions were amended several times
between 1979 and 1993.
In relation to redundancy, the TULRCA 1992 specified the information to be disclosed:
reasons for the redundancies, the number to be dismissed, the methods of selection and
implementation, and the calculation of redundancy payments.18   The legislation also required
the employer to give a reasoned reply to any representations which might be made.  In terms
of timing, the requirement to consult was activated at the time when the employer was
proposing to make employees redundant.  The legislation also provided that, where there
were special circumstances which rendered it impracticable to comply with the requirements,
the employer should take all such steps towards compliance as were reasonably feasible in
the circumstances.19  If an employer failed to consult and disclose, the trade union could
present a collective complaint to an industrial tribunal, which could make a protective
award.20
The disclosure obligations relating to business transfers provided that, before a relevant
transfer, the employer should inform appropriate representatives of the following matters:
the reasons for the transfer and its timing, the implications for the employees concerned,
measures the employer might take in relation to the affected employees, and measures which
the transferor envisaged the transferee might take in relation to the employees.21  The
employer was under a duty to inform, but there was not always a duty to consult.  The
obligation to consult arose where an employer envisaged that he would take ‘measures’ in
relation to any affected employees.  The employer had to consult appropriate representatives
with a view to seeking their agreement on the measures to be taken.22  The duty to furnish
information was activated when a transfer was proposed, and the obligation to give
information applied to all the above areas.23  As with the redundancy provisions, if there were
special circumstances, which rendered it impracticable to disclose, the employer must take all
such steps towards compliance as were reasonably feasible in the circumstances.24  If an
employer failed to inform or consult, the union or affected employee could present a
complaint to an industrial tribunal.25
In both the case of both collective redundancy and business transfers, the law was
subsequently amended in response to the 1994 European Court of Justice decision that the
UK had failed properly to implement the Directives in that the right of consultation was only
available to recognised trade unions. 26  The European Court of Justice decision led to the
introduction of the Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of
Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 1995.27  The 1995 regulations amended the
consultation provisions of TULRCA 1992 and the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of
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provided that, where employees were to be affected by redundancies or business transfers, the
employer must consult with either a recognised trade union or employee representatives
elected in advance or ad hoc.28  The regulations also introduced two further changes relating
to redundancy:  the first only required consultation where the employer proposed 20 or more
redundancies over a 90-day period and the second relaxed the previous requirements
concerning the timing of redundancy consultation.
As a result of criticisms of the 1995 regulations, the Labour government has introduced
new rules concerning the employers’ obligations when consulting on redundancies and
business transfers.  The alterations to the law are contained in the Collective Redundancies
and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 1999.
The 1999 regulations make amendments to the redundancy consultation provisions of
TULRCA 1992 and the provisions of the TUPE regulations.  We comment on these changes
in section 5 below.
There are other miscellaneous requirements for disclosure of information under UK
law.  Under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and related regulations (many derived
from European Directives), employers are under a general duty to consult safety
representatives concerning the promotion of health and safety.  In particular, there has to be
consultation about the introduction of measures which may substantially affect the health and
safety of employees, the arrangements for appointing or nominating representatives, and
relevant consequences of the introduction of new technologies.  As part of this process,
employers must disclose necessary information and in this case non-compliance can result in
fines.  The Health and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996 require
employers to consult with employees not covered by safety representatives appointed by a
recognised trade union.29  In these cases, employers are obliged to disclose such information
as is necessary to enable employees or their representatives to participate fully and effectively
in consultations.30  The provisions of the Act are enforceable by the Health and Safety
Executive and local authority inspectors.
In the area of occupational pension schemes, there are also disclosure obligations which
require specific information to be disclosed.   Thus, the Pensions Act 1995 requires the
disclosure of auditing and accounting information.  Trustees must disclose the following
documents:  audited accounts; the auditor’s statement about contributions under the scheme;
and actual valuations and statements.  The information must be disclosed to members and
their spouses, beneficiaries, and recognised trade unions.31  In addition, there are other
regulations providing for the disclosure of information about the running of pension schemes.
In this context, trustees have an obligation to provide the following:  information about the
constitution of the scheme, trust deeds, and rules; basic information about membership,
contributions, tax status, contracting-out benefits, pension increases and transfers; specific
information relating to certain occasions such as when benefits become payable at death or on
resignation or when a scheme is wound-up.
The information is to be made available for inspection on request or within a reasonable
time after the request is made.  Any question as to recognition of a trade union for the
purposes of collective bargaining in relation to the members of a scheme must be referred to
an industrial tribunal. 32  In addition, an employer who intends to establish a contracted-out
scheme must issue notices to employees and any recognised union.  Notices must be in
writing and include the following:  the arrangements of the scheme and its coverage; the date
from which it is intended that contracting-out will commence; contributions and benefits
under the scheme and any changes subsequent to contracting-out; details of the running of the
scheme; and names and addresses of persons to whom representations may be made on these
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employer has complied with the requirements can be referred to an industrial tribunal.33
Finally, there are disclosure obligations contained in the European Works Council
(EWC) Directive (94/45/EC), the stated aim of which is to improve the right to information
and consultation of employees in enterprises operating in the European Union.34  Relating to
undertakings or groups of undertakings with at least 1,000 employees and with at least 150
employees in at least two establishments in different member states, this requires the
establishment of an EWC or an alternative employee information and consultation procedure.
Central management must meet at least once a year with the EWC for the purposes of
consultation and the provision of information, on the basis of a report drawn up by
management.  The information disclosed must relate in particular to the following:  the
economic and financial situation of the business; the probable development of the business,
production, and sales; the situation and trend of investments and employment; substantial
changes concerning organisation, new working methods, transfers of production, mergers,
retrenchment, or closures; and collective redundancies.  In addition, in exceptional
circumstances, for example, in the event of the closure of an establishment, there should be
an extra ad hoc meeting for information disclosure and consultation as soon as is possible.
Member states must provide for appropriate remedies in the event of a failure to comply with
the Directive; in particular employee representatives should have access to administrative or
judicial appeal procedures when management claims confidentiality or fails to provide
information.35
There are two recent proposals from the EU, concerning National Works Councils and
Information and Consultation obligations.  In the first case, the Commission seeks to
establish an EU-wide framework of minimum standards of information and consultation at
national level, giving employees a greater voice in the running of companies, with or without
the agreement of employers.  The Labour government is opposed to these measures,
preferring instead to encourage voluntary agreements based on the notion of social
partnership.  In the second case, the Commission has proposed a directive on establishing a
general framework for informing and consulting employees in EU countries. 36  Information
and consultation is regarded as an essential tool for employees to adapt to organisational and
work change.  The Commission argues that change is necessary because of the weaknesses of
national and EU law, since where at present information and consultation rights do exist,
these are often formal and a posteriori exercises.37   If these latter proposals were adopted,
they would be an interesting step back towards a more general approach to disclosure in UK
labour law.
Therefore, over the years, there has developed a body of legislation on information
disclosure, along with a set of rights, obligations, exemptions, and procedures.  The next
section focuses on the core legal provisions on disclosure of information for collective
bargaining.
3. The Collective Bargaining Approach
To date, the CAC has dealt with disclosure cases in the following way.  On receipt of a
complaint, the Committee holds an informal meeting involving both parties and usually an
ACAS conciliator.  The aim is to clarify the issues and to decide if they can be solved by
conciliation.  If there is no prospect of agreement or if conciliation fails, the parties proceed
to a full hearing.  This is a more formal occasion where written cases are exchanged, the
proceedings are minuted, and the parties are sometimes represented by counsel.  The
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claim is well founded and giving general considerations underlying the decision.
In practice, the CAC devotes most of its time to assisting employers and unions to
resolve disclosure issues by informal meetings.  In this indirect way the procedure would
seem to have had considerable success.  As the CAC has stated, ‘The Committee relies
heavily on the process of conciliation to achieve a solution that improves existing industrial
relations….  The cases which go to full hearing and are published therefore give a slanted
impression of the effectiveness of the procedure.  In those resolved at an earlier stage, the
procedure frequently results in a better understanding and the flow of much if not all the
information requested.’38
Between 1976 when the disclosure provisions first came into force and the end of 1999,
the Committee had handled 476 complaints, an average of 20 per year.  During that period,
65 cases required a formal declaration; two cases resulted in the issuance of a second award
after an employer’s failure to honour a section 184 declaration;39 one case resulted in the
application of the enforcement procedure under section 185;40 and four awards have been the
subject of judicial review.41  Taking the number of cases over time, there was an initial
enthusiasm in the early years of the legislation.  Thereafter, the total number of cases fell and
remained low through the 1980s, before rising again in the early 1990s and falling again in
the late 1990s.
These fluctuations may reflect a number of factors.  On the one hand, the decline and
low level through the 1980s might in part have reflected the indirect success of the provisions
on voluntary disclosure.  Thus, the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey shows that about
one fifth of manual shop stewards in private manufacturing reported that they had sought
information under the legislation in 1984 (this compared with around one tenth of stewards in
private services, the public sector, and among non-manual stewards).  The proportions
making use of the provisions remained stable over the period up to 1990.  Those who had
made such requests were asked how much information management had supplied – all, most,
some, or none at all.  Four-fifths of representatives (manual and non-manual) said they
received all, most, or some of the information in 1984, a figure which remained the same in
1990.42  One cannot rule out the proposition that the underlying pattern of voluntary
disclosure by managers changed across this period, reducing the need to resort to law.
On the other hand, the fall in formal complaints might also have reflected early
disappointment with the provisions and the fact that, from the early 1980s, the unions were
too busy dealing with the legislation of the Thatcher years.  This explanation might in turn be
allied to the decline in the coverage of collective bargaining in the 1980s.  In these
circumstances, the disclosure of information may not have seemed a high priority for
beleaguered union members and their shop stewards.  Thus, trade unions may have chosen
not to initiate disclosure claims, either because they had other more pressing problems or
because they could not mobilise sufficient workplace support around related issues.
In the early 1990s, the number of complaints increased, though with a significant
proportion being later settled or withdrawn.  In this latter respect, it should be noted that the
main reason for a union to withdraw a case is that it has been settled.  It is difficult to isolate
one particular factor to explain the higher level in the early and mid 1990s, since the cases
cover a wide range of industries and subject matter.  The interest might reflect a combination
of economic upswing, accelerated business change, and a more pragmatic adjustment on the
part of unions.  For its part, the CAC stated in 1991:  ‘At a time of many far-reaching
structural changes in employer-employee relations, the agenda of items on which information
will be required is ever lengthening.  Information is as important to constructive collective
bargaining as ever.  Recent experience emphasises that one element in the management of
7change is the provision of information and, the greater the degree of change, the more will be
the level of pressure on the arrangements through which information is disclosed.’43
The upward trend in the early and mid 1990s may also reflect a response from unions to
the decentralisation of business activities, individualisation of employment relations, and
privatisation and outsourcing.  This might in turn be associated with a further devolution of
bargaining.44  This view is supported by the 1995 CAC report which states, ‘a common theme
running through the complaints … was that the differences between the parties were of a
more fundamental character because the nature of bargaining had changed.  This took two
forms:  firstly, that the structure had been revised or, secondly, that the payment system had
changed and in turn put pressures on a bargaining system that neither party had hitherto
encountered.’45  These changes were related to complaints in two specific areas.  First, there
were a series of claims and one formal award on market testing and contracting-out and the
decentralised bargaining around this.  Second, there were several complaints involving
changes in pay systems in general and the growth of individual performance-related pay in
particular.  In relation to the latter, the CAC has stated that both the establishment and
outcome of performance-related schemes constitute collective bargaining for statutory
purposes if the union is recognised for such matters.46
As to the type of information required, that concerning terms and conditions of the
represented group has always been the main category and has also been the most likely to
succeed.47  Since the late 1970s, however, the emphasis has shifted away from job evaluated
grading arrangements and towards new wage systems such as performance- and profit-related
pay and towards pension matters.  Requests for financial information have increased as a
proportion of the total over the years, perhaps reflecting greater union awareness of the
importance of such questions and greater management caution in a more competitive
environment.  However, significantly, this is one of the areas where unions are least likely to
be successful.  By contrast, requests for information on labour costs and employment
budgeting has declined over time.  Requests for disclosure of information on non-labour
costs, plant location, and closures have rarely been awarded.  It is likely that the low success
rate in the past has resulted in less frequent requests for such information.  In total, since the
introduction of the legislation, just over half of trade union complaints have been held to be
well founded.  Union complaints were more likely to be successful on terms and conditions
of the represented group and on labour costs and human resource budgeting; they were least
likely to be successful on terms and conditions in other organisations, on terms and
conditions of other groups within the same organisation, and on profits, financial affairs, and
the overall state of the organisation.
The most often used employer objection to information disclosure has been that
collective bargaining would not be materially impeded by non-disclosure (182 (2) (a)).  This
was also the defence most likely to succeed.  The objection that the information was not
about a matter related to collective bargaining was also frequently raised (181 (1)).  However,
this defence had the highest failure rate.  In addition, a high level of objections was made
under section 182 (1) (d) that information related specifically to an individual and under
section 182 (1) (c) that the information had been supplied to the employer in confidence.
In summary, the provisions under TULRCA 1992 would seem to offer in potentia a
broad set of legal rights.  Over the years, an indirect effect may have been that the threat to
use them may have induced employers voluntarily to disclose information.  The number of
cases settled or withdrawn may also indicate that the CAC has had some measure of success.
However, in practice, the obstacles and tests under the law are extremely restrictive, and this
is undoubtedly one reason why, after an initial enthusiasm, use of the provisions declined and
remained low before reviving again in recent years.
84. A Critique of the Law on Disclosure for Collective Bargaining
These provisions constitute some underpinning for collective bargaining in the UK.
However, they contain elements that reduce their value to trade unions.  In the first place,
information need only be provided for the purposes of collective bargaining as defined by the
Act and disclosure is limited to matters for which the union is recognised.48  Thus, claims for
information, relating to costs and prices or to organisational restructuring where the topic had
not previously been an accepted bargaining subject, falls foul of the provision. 49  There then
exist the two tests contained in section 181(2).
The first test, of ‘good industrial relations’ practice, is vague.  The CAC itself has
admitted that it is hampered, in the articulation of a standard, by the weak consensus as to
practice.  ‘Information, which is commonly disclosed in one sector, may be regarded as a
tightly guarded secret in another.’50  Moreover, the CAC has concluded that it cannot act as a
trailblazer or standard-setter.51  However, it should be noted that in 1986 the Divisional Court
held that the specialist skill and experience of the CAC enabled it to draw its own conclusions
as to whether good industrial relations practice required the giving of the information.52
The second test, of material impediment, is an even bigger obstacle to a union seeking
to pursue a complaint where it has managed without such information in the past.  Many
employers have successfully objected that there was no impediment and unions are severely
disadvantaged in arguing the need for information that they do not possess.  Moreover, in an
early case, the Committee produced a fairly restrictive definition of material impediment:  ‘It
might be argued that this test is a question of relevance.  All relevant information prima facie
makes for more open and better bargaining.  But, we note the negatively expressed rule.  It
speaks of evidence “without which” the trade union would be impeded.  This narrows
considerably the test from one of relevance to one of importance’.53  The information must be
relevant and significant to the material area of collective bargaining.54   However, in the case
of BP Chemicals (Award 86/1), the CAC adopted a more flexible approach which was upheld
on judicial review.  In determining material impediment, the Committee stated in this case
that ‘one should recall that the purpose of the provisions is to improve collective bargaining.
If the disclosure of information would secure a more constructive and less abrasive approach,
it removes an impediment to the bargaining.’55
A further limitation of the provisions relates to the timing of disclosure.  The CAC may
only adjudicate upon a past failure to disclose and may not declare what information the
employer should disclose in the future, even though this might help avoid a subsequent
dispute.56  In this context, it has been remarked that ‘the disclosure procedure cannot be used
like an order of discovery in an industrial tribunal around which a case can be built.’57  Thus,
a union is unable to plan its bargaining approach in anticipation of having all relevant
documents at the most appropriate time. The bargaining process would have to begin and the
union suspend proceedings in order to present a claim to the CAC to obtain information
which had been refused.  The fact that the CAC procedure must then be exhausted before any
sanction is applied means that the matter in dispute must be capable of being pursued over a
considerable length of time.  Otherwise it means the employer can delay disclosure of the
information until its usefulness is limited or has passed.  The often urgent need for the
information and the laborious process for obtaining it may therefore cause unions to give up
on the procedure.
A further weakness of the provisions is the enforcement mechanism contained in
section 185, since the sanction neither forces disclosure of the information nor provides for a
punitive element to be included in the award.  To date, this procedure has been used only
once in the Holokrome case (79/451).  In that instance, the union’s request to the CAC did
not take the form of a terms and conditions claim, but was a request for the inclusion of the
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Committee awarded that ‘information relating to salary scales and any fixed increases for the
grade of each individual employee should have effect as part of an individual’s contract of
employment.’  However, the union was unable to secure contractual incorporation of all the
information awarded, since parts of it were later regarded as unsuitable for inclusion in the
individuals’ employment contracts.  This is not surprising since there are undoubtedly
differences between information useful in collective bargaining and information suitable for
inclusion in an individual’s employment contract.  Thus, contested information, which might
relate to matters between the employer and the union as opposed to the employer and the
individual, would not be suitable for such inclusion.
Finally, there are shortcomings in the ACAS Code of Practice.  On the evidence of
some CAC declarations, this has not been of great assistance or guidance.  Thus, in an early
case, the CAC consulted the Code for guidance on two matters:  on the general principle of
‘good industrial relations’ practice and on the more specific question of how bargaining units
might affect the scope of disclosure.  It concluded that the Code gave no clear guidance on
these points.58  In another case relating to good practice, the CAC asked:  ‘What is the
standard of good industrial relations?  It cannot be some vision which each of us have of a
desirable future since that will differ infinitely according to the individual.  The legislation
clearly intended us to be guided by a less subjective choice than that, for it is provided that
we should be guided by the relevant ACAS Code of Practice.  The current code is of little
help in this connection.’59
Thus, the tests and exemptions contained in the Act are extensive and restrictive.  They
inhibit union claims for information and provide employers with a wide range of arguments
against disclosure.
5. Alternative Legal Forms of Disclosure
One response to this situation might be that new legislation in more specific areas and recent
developments on disclosure for consultation emanating from Europe might provide an
alternative and better way forward for providing information to employees.  We now,
therefore, return to the legislation outlined in section 2.  However, this set of provisions,
although more focused, does have certain other problems.
The provisions pertaining to collective redundancies have several weaknesses.  In the
first place, the specified information is very focused on the redundancy process itself.  It does
not allow for linkages to be made with other information, which might be germane to the
background business decision.  Moreover, union complaints in this area have often been that
information provided by employers is often too late or in insufficient detail.  An early study
suggested that information tended to be provided when the only issues that remained open for
negotiation or consultation were the size of compulsory redundancies and the amount of
redundancy payments.60  Unions would of course value broader information about the
commercial decisions leading to redundancy and about alternative courses of action.
The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of
Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 1995 were thought to have several shortcomings.
First, in relation to the timing of disclosure, it provided that, ‘where an employer is proposing
to make employees redundant, he shall consult in good time,’ rather than at the earliest
opportunity.  The 1995 regulations were also framed in a way which jeopardised the position
of recognised trade unions.  Employers could by-pass such unions and choose to inform and
consult instead with worker representatives who had been elected via a process, which the
employer might potentially influence.  Furthermore, the 1995 Regulations also provided that
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employers need not disclose information and consult if fewer than 20 people were made
redundant in any one establishment.  This is consistent with the threshold contained in the
collective redundancies Directive, but it represents a retrograde step since originally UK law
required consultation regardless of the number of dismissals.
The Labour government has now introduced amendments to the legislation on
employees’ information and consultation rights in the event of redundancies and transfer of
undertakings.  These are contained in the Collective Redundancies and Transfer of
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 1999.  The changes
clarify what needs to be done by employers to undertake genuine consultation in the event of
planning redundancies or the transfer from one employer to another.  The changes proposed
are intended to remedy weaknesses, improve the operation of the regulations, and ensure that
the UK complies fully with European law in the following ways.
First, in relation to redundancies, it is stipulated that representatives of all employees
who might be affected need to be consulted and not just those whom it is proposed to make
redundant.  Hence this enlarges the scope of consultation.  It has been remarked that this
change will require employers to consult over the consequential impact on ‘survivor’
employees in areas such as work organisation and work-load.61  Second, employers who
recognise a trade union must in future consult that union and cannot bypass the union by
consulting other representatives.  This provision applies to both redundancies and business
transfers.  Third, it is made clear that consultation may only take place exclusively with other
representatives in cases where there is no recognised union.  In such circumstances, the
regulations prescribe specific requirements for the election of the employee representatives to
be consulted.  The rules place the responsibility on the employer to operate fair elections and
also grant employees, who believe that the elections do not accord with the legal
requirements, the right to make a complaint to an employment tribunal.  Fourth, the
regulations provide employee representatives with specific rights for time off for training.
Finally, the remedies that employees and their representatives may obtain in cases where
employers fail to comply with the regulations are simplified and strengthened.
However the changes the government have implemented have not remedied all the
weaknesses of the previous regulations.  First, employers are still only required to consult ‘in
good time’ and not ‘at the earliest’ opportunity.  Second, the government has not removed the
current exemption from the consultation requirements of redundancy proposals affecting
fewer than 20 workers.
With respect to business transfers, the law applies whenever there is a change in the
natural or legal person who is responsible for carrying on the business and who incurs the
obligations of an employer towards employees of the undertaking.  There is no transfer if
there is a sale or transfer of shares, because the corporate personality of the company does not
alter, the employer remains unchanged, and continuity is unaffected.  This is a significant
limitation since the economic control of the undertaking may have changed and this may
have important implications for the future direction of the undertaking and therefore for the
employees.  However, as the regulations do not apply to such transfers there is no
requirement for disclosure or consultation in these circumstances.62  The House of Lords
Select Committee recommended that takeovers by share transfers should be brought within
the coverage of the European Acquired Rights Directive (77/187).63  However, the
government has stated that it is not inclined to support any such amendment to the Directive,
although it is still considering the issue.64  In addition, the obligation to inform and consult
only applies to the measures, which the employer envisages will be taken in relation to
affected employees.  If no measures are proposed, then no information or consultation is
required.
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Trade unions might well wish to be consulted as much when measures were not
envisaged as when they were.65  In addition, for the need to consult to arise, the employer
must have formulated some definite plan or proposal on which it is intended to act as opposed
to mere projections or forecasts.  It has also been stated that in a developing situation, for
reasons beyond an employer’s control, measures might only be envisaged at a late stage.  In
that situation, if there was insufficient time for effective consultations to take place before the
transfer, the employer could not be criticised.66  Furthermore the obligation to consult is
restricted to the subject matter of the proposed measures and not the other heads listed in
Regulation 10 (2) TUPE 1981.67  These restrictions on information disclosure may result in
the employer unnecessarily withholding highly relevant information, which would be of
value to employees and their representatives.
Pensions law requires the disclosure of detailed information to members of schemes
and their trade unions.  However, the provisions are very specific and do not constitute a
significant extension of information rights.  Moreover, it could be argued that the law does
not provide for the disclosure of sufficient information to enable the performance of trustees
to be properly monitored.  Trustees can only be required to disclose information relating to
the taking of particular decisions if it can be shown that they have not acted in good faith.
The limited circumstances in which trustees must inform members of the reasons for their
decisions fall short of what is required if the actions of trustees are to be effectively
monitored and members’ interests protected.68  Information and consultation rights are
especially important if trade unions and employee representatives are to be in a position to
safeguard and further the interests of their members in occupational pension schemes.  In this
respect, although the Pensions Act 1995 requires trustees to provide a report to the
Occupational Pensions Regulatory Authority if employer contributions are not paid on time,
there is no obligation to disclose this information to employee representatives or trade
unions.69  In addition there are also disclosure issues surrounding the situation where an
employer wishes to take a payment of surplus from an ongoing scheme.  Whilst the
requirements of section 37 (4) of the Pensions Act 1995 must be complied with before an
employer can receive such a payment, trade unions have no information or consultation rights
on the matter.  Finally although trustees are under an obligation to provide a written statement
detailing the principles governing investment decisions, there is no requirement directly to
furnish more detailed information.70
The Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and related regulations have created new legal
rights and also a new institution in the person of the safety representative.  Here the law may
have aided the development of workplace processes of joint regulation.  It may also have
been significant in extending collective bargaining to smaller firms and in expanding its
scope where it was already established.  However, the law is weak in enforcing disclosure,
and smaller, non-union firms are often unaffected.71  The evidence suggests that employees
benefit most in situations where health and safety is dealt with by joint union-management
committees rather than by management acting unilaterally or by consultation with employee
representatives.72  The new requirements introduced by the Health and Safety (Consultation
with Employees) Regulations 1996 have not overcome certain weaknesses.  Though there is a
requirement to consult with employees, there is no obligation on an employer to create any
particular institutional arrangement, and representatives do not have the right to require the
establishment of a safety committee.  The provisions do not prescribe how elections should
be held, which may cast doubt on the independence of those elected.73  Greater disclosure and
consultation rights for employees may result in higher health and safety standards in the
workplace, which in turn would lead to a reduction in injuries and illness, better industrial
relations, and improved performance.  The Health and Safety Executive have acknowledged
this fact stating ‘improved information and consultation are the key to improving safety.’74  It
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is possible to identify the type of information, which could be disclosed to safety
representatives, which would lead to an improvement in health and safety standards.  In this
area, unions have started to think about rights to information on the following:  the injury and
illness rate at each workplace; details of any reports concerning possible occupational or
environmental health problems relating to the company’s activities; details of the safety,
health, and environmental enforcement activity at the workplace; reports of any assessments
of risks from workplace or environmental hazards; and the findings of any environmental
audit.75
Finally, it might be argued that the EWC Directive represents a significant new route to
increase employee rights to information and consultation in multinational companies and a
possible vehicle for trade unions indirectly to influence strategic decision-making.  If this is
to be achieved, trade unions and employer representatives must be able to raise issues of
concern and generate a management response.  Research on EWCs has revealed some cause
for concern, suggesting that their activities are for the most part dominated by management
and that they do not enable employee representatives seriously to participate in decision
making.76  Trade unions and employee representatives need to be able to procure information
which is of value and leads to a constructive dialogue.  However, discussion with
inexperienced works councils that lack union involvement will necessarily be limited.
Agreements entered into by the special negotiating body and management under Article 5 (3)
need careful scrutiny to ensure management is not attempting to avoid the spirit of the
Directive, since there is considerable scope for tactical manoeuvring within the framework of
the directive.  In the circumstances where the subsidiary requirements apply, it could be
argued that, the information and consultation provisions are fairly limited, requiring only one
meeting a year and the presentation of information of a highly aggregate nature.  Another
weakness of the Directive is that it allows member states to provide that management may
withhold information which would be prejudicial or which would seriously harm the
functioning of the undertakings concerned.77
The effectiveness of EWCs will also depend on the effective enforcement of the
Directive through the legal system and the existence of effective sanctions of a proportional
and dissuasive nature to be applied in cases of breach.  For its part, the TUC, while
recognising the potential shortcomings in this respect, has supported the provision for
consensual agreements and has seen them as an important way of gaining consultation and
information in multinational enterprises.78
In summary, the provisions on collective redundancies, business transfers, and health
and safety have developed both in an ad hoc way and as a  reaction to European
requirements.  The provisions pertaining to collective redundancies and business transfers
still have some shortcomings.  The EWC Directive also has some weaknesses, which will
inhibit employees and unions from securing information and consultation and thereby
extending their influence within multinational companies.   It is difficult to anticipate what
might be the consequences of the new EU proposals referred to above.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
To date, the existing law on disclosure would seem to have had a small, but positive impact,
direct and indirect, on the flow of information between employers and their employees in
both collective bargaining and joint consultation.  An improvement in disclosure for both
these processes would seem to be important if employee voice at work is to be extended and
if the current concept of partnership is to be a reality.  There is, however, a continuing tension
in the UK between the traditional approach to disclosure and employee representation based
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on collective bargaining and the alternative approach to information and consultation rights
derived in part from European Union initiatives.79  Indeed, there is a possibility that the one
may displace the other, and the two approaches are often portrayed as dichotomous.  In
practice, unions may view the two approaches as complementary and seek to utilise both to
produce a comprehensive framework of information, bargaining, and consultation rights for
employees and their representatives.
 However, there are important analytical differences between the UK law on disclosure
for collective bargaining and the European influenced provisions.  They can be exposed by
analysing both the assumptions of the UK approach and the bargaining model on which it
rests.
The disclosure provisions are auxiliary in nature, in that they are intended to support the
collective bargaining process.  However, two features imply that the provisions are not
intended to extend the coverage or scope of collective bargaining.  First, access is restricted
to recognised unions.  Second the use of the negative material impediment test implies that
the provisions do not have the role of widening the bargaining agenda.
In fact, the assumptions are sufficiently specific and idiosyncratic to be itemised.  First,
the provisions assume information asymmetry exists in the bargaining relationship.  Second,
they assume that it operates to the disadvantage of the union, or at least the collective
bargaining process.  The presumption of ss 184-5 is that disclosed information will yield
some bargaining advantage.  Third, they assume that at least some employers who have
recognised trade unions will sustain information asymmetry to the point of impeding the
bargaining process.  This may occur where employers change their policies, for example on
performance related pay, in ways which require unions to gain access to more or different
information on employment matters where the relevant information is not disclosed to
individual employees.  However, in many cases, a commitment to recognition sits awkwardly
with an intent to impede the collective bargaining process.
One may debate whether the implicit bargaining model underlying this set of
assumptions is, empirically, widespread.  If employers recognise trade unions, under what
circumstances would they wish to impede the collective bargaining process?  One could
argue that the provisions as currently detailed might be of more use to a union seeking
recognition than to one which has achieved it.  This would render the provisions truly
auxiliary.  Conversely, if employers wish to impede the collective bargaining process, why
not derecognise the union? For much of the life of the provisions, no legal constraints have
impeded this course of action.  In short, the phrasing of the provisions is likely to render
advantage to trade unions in a relatively small number of bargaining contexts; this is the most
likely explanation for their limited use.
The UK provisions constitute an agenda-driven disclosure model, i.e. the trigger for
their use  lies within the bargaining agenda.  However, the provisions ultimately stemming
from European Directives are event-driven, i.e. they are triggered by specific employer
initiated events which affect employment contracts in many ways irrespective of the
representative context.  Whereas the concern of the former is with the vitality of a process,
the concern of the latter is primarily procedural justice in the operation or termination of
employment contracts.  As we have shown, the latter operate in a palliative rather than
preventative way, and they need have no continuous impact on bargaining relationships.
Their advantage lies in the absence of any necessary association with collective bargaining
processes which are shrinking in coverage.
The potential strength of disclosure for collective bargaining is that trade unions have
the organisational capability to use information in that they are continuous associations, with
a real independence of the employer and with expertise and resources beyond the workplace.
However, given the shrinkage of collective bargaining and the growth of non-union
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workplaces, disclosure for consultation has become more important in recent years.  The
legal framework should aim to provide good disclosure for collective bargaining wherever
possible; where this is not possible, there is a need for the provision of good information for
joint consultation.  To this end, the TULRCA 1992 provisions for disclosure need to be
improved along with better information provision for joint consultation.
Several reforms to TULRCA 1992 could be considered which, if implemented, would
represent an improvement on the current position with regard to disclosure for collective
bargaining.  The right to information could be made more extensive, especially in the areas of
non-labour costs, financial matters, the state of the organisation, and corporate strategy.  The
statutory restrictions on disclosure could also be more narrowly defined.  The timing of
disclosure is crucial, and here employers might be placed under a duty to provide information
‘as soon as possible.’  Good disclosure practice requires more positive employer action and
the role of legislation should be the promotion of such a development.  Against this standard,
it would seem the present law is inadequate.  The ‘substantial injury’ and other safeguards
cast the employer as a reluctant divulger of secrets rather than an active participant in
information transmission and social partnership at work.  It would seem to be in the interests
of unions therefore to press for changes in the law based on a wider notion of the area of
collective bargaining, together with a more effective enforcement mechanism, but without the
stringent safeguards concerning confidentiality, substantial injury, production of documents,
and disproportionate work.  For deliberate breaches of the obligation to disclose, the law
could impose financial penalties on recalcitrant employers and CAC declarations might be
made enforceable in the courts.  In this respect, the UK could look to the approach of
Swedish law on disclosure to trade unions, where sanctions for abuse of the provisions are
stronger, with the possibility of punitive damages for deliberate breaches.80   Finally, the
ACAS Code of Practice should be reviewed so that the code gives better guidance on the
general principle of ‘good industrial relations’ practice.  The code might encourage
management and unions to pursue the following:  to agree a joint policy on the provision and
disclosure of information and to develop information agreements linking the provision of
information to business and collective bargaining issues.81
In turn, the law on disclosure for consultation has a number of weaknesses.  It is
disclosure for very specific purposes; it is not always easy to make linkages, say between
information on a business transfer and the underlying commercial factors which gave rise to
the strategic decision; and it is disclosure to representatives who do not usually have the
organisational capability and independence which unions possess.  However, given the
shrinkage of collective bargaining, disclosure for consultation has become more important in
recent years.  It would certainly be wrong, therefore, to throw the baby out with the bath
water and to argue against strengthening of the law in this area.  At the very least, the existing
European disclosure requirements connected with collective redundancies and business
transfers should be fully implemented in the UK.  In these and other areas, such as pensions
and health and safety, greater consistency and improvements could be made in terms of the
timing of disclosure and the nature of information provided.  In this respect also, rather than
rejecting the concept of national works councils, the government should adopt the initiative
and make it a central forum for meaningful information disclosure.  Worker representatives
and trade unions need to be given sufficiently detailed information at the earliest opportunity
if they are to be effectively involved in decisions at work.  In the case of EWCs and any
proposed national works councils, there should be access to less aggregated information, at
the earliest opportunity, and with real sanctions against employers who fail to comply.  In the
UK context, it is then to be hoped that, in a more supportive legal environment, such
provisions might both give strength to, and derive strength from, trade unions along German
lines.
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Improvements to disclosure of information for collective bargaining and joint
consultation could have significant benefits for employee relations.  Trade unions and worker
representatives would be in a better position to assess the employment requirements of firms
and their ability to afford pay increases.  In addition, they would be better placed to assess
development plans, to monitor skill levels and productive efficiency, and to ensure that
management is best exploiting commercial opportunities.  Information is of particular
importance in the rapidly changing and competitive environment within which organisations
now operate.  The neglected area of disclosure of information could be a central part in the
Labour government’s aim to build a more positive system of employee relations.  As Otto
Kahn Freund wrote, ‘Negotiation does not deserve its name if one of the negotiating parties is
kept in the dark about matters within the exclusive knowledge of the other which are relevant
to an agreement.’82  By extension, this observation applies not only to information for
effective collective bargaining, but also to information for meaningful consultation or any
real notion of social partnership at work.
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